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Introduction 
Modern economics operates within a wider cultural and intellectual context where 
pluralism is widespread. This pluralism arose from a reaction in the last few decades 
against the measuring of cultural experience and intellectual ideas against some 
notion of an absolute norm, which tended to dominate in the middle of the twentieth 
century. Thus there is now a positive embracing of the pluralist society and a rejection 
of scientism. 
Economics, like all disciplines, has been influenced by this development. But 
economics can be distinguished from the other social sciences by its conscious 
positioning as being closest to the physical sciences. Thus, while other social sciences 
develop theories of human nature and social structure, mainstream economics has 
captured human nature in a set of ‘self-evident’ axioms. These axioms in turn form 
the foundation of a system of classical logic from which propositions are deduced 
whose truth content can be determined by means of empirical testing. The origins of 
this approach can be found in physics (see Mirowski, 1989). Now that physics no 
longer conforms to logical positivism, the model of modern economics can more 
readily be found in pure mathematics (see Blaug, 1999). The methodological 
framework espoused by mainstream economics, therefore, is not apparently open to 
pluralism. Classical logic applied to the axioms and testing the ensuing propositions 
against ‘the facts’ are seen as definitive; there may still be arguments, but these can 
‘in principle’ be resolved with sufficient technical advance in modelling and testing.  
Nevertheless there are distinct signs of pluralism within mainstream economics. There 
is for a start a notable diversity of approach, such that mainstream economics can no 
longer readily be defined simply in terms of a general equilibrium system. For 
example, while game theory depicts deterministic axiom-based behaviour, it does not 
fit readily into a general equilibrium system. Further, the kind of inconsistency which 
general equilibrium theory was designed to resolve is now evident in mainstream 
economics; new growth theory for example incorporates an endogenous money 
supply function in contrast to the exogenous money supply function of New Classical 
macroeconomics.  
This pluralism in mainstream economics can be supported by the postmodern 
argument that the methodological strictures of logical positivism cannot be sustained. 
Thus for example Phelps (1990) describes New Classical Economics as postmodern. 
Indeed McCloskey’s (1983) argument for the end of prescriptive methodology was 
embraced by mainstream economists, who prefer not to engage in methodological 
debate. In a modern version of the earlier realism-of-assumptions debate, the 
implication that was drawn was that the structure of theory did not matter; all that 
mattered was empirical testing.  
But in the meantime, other approaches to economics have been evolving, some with 
long pedigrees, employing methodologies quite consciously different from 
mainstream economics. Central to this choice was the view that ‘the facts’ themselves 
are theory-laden and our capacity to test theory is highly constrained. As a result, 
economics consists not only of a dominant mainstream which has been fragmenting, 
substantially cut adrift from methodological scrutiny, but also of a wide range of 
approaches, or schools of thought, or paradigms, each of which asks different 
questions, and answers them in different ways. A feature of some of these non-
mainstream approaches is an openness to other social science disciplines, which 
extends the plurality. In sum, economics consists of a plurality of approaches. 
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This plurality poses particular problems for policy makers. While methodologists 
have concluded that there is no one best way of choosing a theory, policy makers have 
to be decisive (even if the decision is not to act) and they need some basis for making 
such decisions. It is the first purpose of this paper to consider pluralism in economics 
and how policy makers can make reasoned choices between theories. We shall see 
that, in the absence of absolute criteria for theory choice, policy makers need to be 
able to exercise judgement with respect to a wide range of sources of knowledge. This 
has direct implications for economics education. The most obvious implication is that 
economics education should develop students’ knowledge and skills with respect to a 
wide range of sources and types of knowledge. The more difficult implication to 
address is that the foundations need to be laid for developing skills in exercising 
judgement. Considering the implications of pluralism for economics education is the 
second purpose of this paper. 
In order to lay the groundwork for these two analyses, we start by exploring the 
meaning of pluralism, distinguishing particularly between the different levels at which 
the term may be applied. We then discuss the reasons why pluralism can be justified 
in economics, by considering the nature of the economic system. This involves 
exploring the meaning and significance of open and closed systems, in the real world, 
and in knowledge and theory. We are then in a position to proceed to considering how 
policy makers can profit from this pluralism, and what this implies for the education 
of future generations of academic economists and economic policy makers.1 
  
The Meaning of Pluralism 
Pluralism can be present at several levels, and these need to be distinguished if we are 
to understand what is involved in theoretical pluralism. Pluralism in general involves 
variety, a classification according to a plurality of categories. It can be distinguished 
from monism, which involves unity rather than plurality, or dualism which involves 
categorisation by a duality.  
Pluralism involves something more than plurality.2 It involves some element of 
judgement rather than pure description, such that pluralism can be grouped along a 
spectrum, from weak pluralism to strong pluralism. Weak pluralism simply involves 
an acknowledgement of plurality, a willingness to contemplate ‘otherness’, without 
any judgement as to whether or not this plurality is welcome. Pluralism becomes 
stronger the greater the degree of advocacy for plurality; we consider arguments for 
this more clearly normative pluralism in the next section. 
But first we need to consider a further feature of pluralism, that it can be applied to a 
variety of levels. We start here with theoretical pluralism. When policy makers face a 
variety of theories which provide different analyses of real problems, suggest different 
solutions and predict different outcomes they are encountering pluralism at the level 
of theory.  As long as the decision maker has a set of criteria for choosing the best 
theory to address a particular problem, this variety is not problematic. It is variety 
where it is not clear which is the best theory that is regarded as a problematic 
pluralism. It is a common joke told against economists that we can never agree, and 
even that the same economist may simultaneously put forward more than one view 
(‘on the one hand . . . on the other hand . . .’ ). 
                                                          
1 See Salanti and Screpanti (1997) for a diversity of treatments on the subject of pluralism. 
2 See in particular Maki’s chapter in Salanti and Screpanti (1997). 
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Within economics itself, pluralism may also be understood in terms of pluralism of 
method, whereby theories may draw on different types of model, or more generally 
reasoning, and on different types of evidence. This is often referred to also as 
eclecticism. The economist may be thought of as carrying a toolbox out of which a 
range of tools can be produced. But without any apparent criteria for deciding which 
are to be used for which purpose this does not take us very far. This can be a source of 
regret, among those seeking monism of method. Blanchard and Fischer (1989: 505) 
put it as follows: 
‘Although it is widely adopted and almost as widely espoused, the 
eclectic position is not logically comfortable. It would be better for 
economists to have an all-purpose model, derived explicitly from 
microfoundations and embodying all relevant information, to 
analyse all issues in macroeconomics (or perhaps all issues in 
economics). We are not quite there yet. And if we ever were, we 
would in all likelihood have little understanding of the mechanisms 
at work behind the results of simulations. Thus we have no choice 
but to be eclectic.’  
For some, therefore, theoretical pluralism and pluralism of method are seen as 
problematic at a different, methodological, level. What is looked for is a methodology 
which provides a basis for deciding on the methods to be used and the criteria by 
which theories are to be judged. But a methodology which provides this guidance in 
turn may be one of many. There can also be methodological pluralism – more than 
one methodology. How then are we to choose between different sets of criteria? This 
pushes us back to the level of epistemology, but again there is scope for pluralism in 
that there may be different theories as to the best way to build up knowledge and 
therefore as to the best methodology. Theology might suggest a monist epistemology 
– all knowledge derives from divine revelation – while a pluralist epistemology might 
involve knowledge being derived from experience, imagination and reason, for 
example.  
This categorisation can be applied further at the level of reality. This can be called 
ontological pluralism. Indeed pluralism or monism in philosophy refers to whether 
reality consists of many substances (physical or spiritual) or only one. A monist 
ontology would involve all matter being reducible to one basic substance, like a 
subatomic particle, or all behaviour being reducible to a common basic element of 
human nature. 
Starting again now from the level of ontology, we can see a logic connecting the 
presence or absence of pluralism at all levels. If reality derives from a unity in nature, 
then, as long as that unity were accessible, there would be one best way of 
constructing knowledge about it, so that science would have one best methodology 
which in turn would specify the best theories and methods to be used to derive and 
assess them. In other words monism in nature feeds through into monism at all other 
levels. The logic breaks down however if the monism in nature is not accessible. Then 
it becomes a matter for argument whether or not it is still possible to settle on one best 
epistemology, methodology, theory and method. The outcome may be monism or 
pluralism. Similarly, if nature is understood to be pluralist, it is a matter for argument 
whether the best knowledge system, methodology etc should be pluralist or not. In 
other words, pluralism at the different levels may be something to be welcomed rather 
than regretted. 
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We will turn in the next section to consider the arguments for pluralism. In the 
process we will consider a further refinement of what is meant by pluralism which 
derives from Mearman (2002). When we refer to the different number of categories in 
monism, dualism and pluralism (one, two, many) there is further the issue of the 
status of those categories. They can be regarded as all-encompassing, mutually-
exclusive, with fixed meaning, or they can be regarded as existing along a spectrum, 
where the divisions are provisional in terms of meaning and ‘location’, and partial in 
that different divisions may apply on different occasions. Which understanding 
prevails depends on the system of thought within which pluralism is being considered. 
In order to treat all these matters, we need to understand the meaning and significance 
of open and closed systems. 
 
Open and Closed Systems – the Reasons for Pluralism 
A guiding principle we will employ here is that the nature of the subject matter should 
determine the way in which we build knowledge about it. We therefore start now with 
the level of reality. There is a risk of circularity – what we can say about the nature of 
the subject matter depends on what we know about it. There are different alternative 
routes to ontology. One is theology, whereby knowledge comes from revelation. 
Another is philosophy, as in the transcendental realist argument (Bhaskar, 1975). My 
own preferred route is that of David Hume, which combined scepticism about the 
scope of reason with the Scottish tradition of common sense philosophy. According to 
Hume, our knowledge of existence comes from conventional belief built up over time 
in the form of socially-constructed knowledge, fed by generations of experience, and 
embedded in institutions and conventions (Dow, 2002).  
As we argued above, monist subject matter justifies a monist knowledge way of 
building up knowledge. If economic behaviour and economic structures are 
understood to be such that they can all be derived from one common set of axioms, as 
in the axioms of rational individual behaviour, then it follows that knowledge should 
be built up as a deductive system from these axioms. The result was the general 
equilibrium framework, which became the conventional socially-constructed basis of 
knowledge in mainstream economics. But in the last decade or so, the confrontation 
of this framework with reality has not been satisfactory. In policy-making, the large 
general equilibrium macro models have proved unsatisfactory. Their primary rationale 
was that they were designed for prediction, but they failed to predict well. There is 
now open discussion in central banking circles about model uncertainty – uncertainty 
as to which is the best model (Goodhart, 1999). Similarly, within economic theory as 
well as policy, alternative types of theory have been developed, notably game theory, 
which seem to explain reality better.  
If the economic system is monist, therefore, we have not identified yet what that 
system is. Indeed the general belief is that the economic system is pluralist. There is 
to start with the issue of how far the economic system can be separated off as a unity 
from other aspects of reality. For most economists there is some degree of acceptance 
that other disciplines address aspects of reality which cannot be separated entirely 
from economics. The Robbins (1932) definition of economics as being concerned 
with any circumstance of scarcity was an attempt nevertheless to define a clear 
disciplinary boundary. The Becker (1991) approach is to address this by extending the 
boundaries of that unity as far as possible, to the economics of the family for example. 
But the scarcity definition rules out situations of underemployment, where at least one 
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factor is not scarce, and dynamic situations of evolution and growth where the 
boundaries of capacity change their nature and shift out. The scarcity definition 
therefore achieves a demarcation at the cost of severely narrowing scope.  
The scarcity definition as an attempt to define a boundary is addressed to closing off 
economics to anything which falls outside the definition, whether that scope is wide 
or narrow; it can be used further to define the subject matter of economics as a closed 
system.3 There is a close relationship between the pairs closed system/open system 
and monism/pluralism, which we will now explore. But we will also find that 
pluralism itself takes on a different meaning depending on whether it is applied within 
a closed system or an open system. 
A closed system is one where all the relevant variables can be identified, where the 
boundaries of the system are knowable, so that variables can be classified as 
endogenous or exogenous, and where the relationships between variables are 
knowable and unchanging (so that all change in the system can be accounted for). The 
constituent parts of the system are of a common, fixed nature, with independent 
existence (as in atoms, or rational individuals). It is a system in reality which displays 
regularities between variables at the empirical level, and which can be represented 
theoretically by an epistemic system of covering laws. It is a monist system in reality 
which generates a monist system of knowledge, and thus a monist methodology: there 
is one best way of building up knowledge about the system. This is an axiomatic 
system of deductive logic, where the axioms refer to the smallest constituent element 
– in the case of general equilibrium economics, rational economic man. 
An open system is one where not all the relevant variables can be identified, and 
where the external boundaries of the system are therefore not knowable. The system is 
subject to outside influences which cannot be accounted for in advance (where 
‘accounted for’ includes knowledge that an outside influence, or relationship, is 
random). Further, within the system, there is scope for change in the relationships 
between variables which cannot be identified in advance, and indeed for change in the 
nature of the constituent variables themselves. Since the system in reality cannot be 
understood in terms of constituent parts of a fixed nature, it is pluralist.  
The choice could still be made nevertheless to require that knowledge be a closed 
system, even though the subject matter is a pluralist open system. Thus, even if 
economists accept that the real social world is an open system, theory may be built up 
as a closed system, as in general equilibrium theory. But then how does theory 
correspond to reality? If it is built on axioms which are not a good representation of 
reality, what are we to make of the conclusions? If real factors are excluded, how do 
we include them when we come to draw policy conclusions? Ceteris paribus does not 
apply in reality. If the empirical evidence comes from an open-system reality, in what 
sense can it be used to test theory? One of the leading figures in the development of 
general equilibrium theory, Frank Hahn, has made precisely these arguments, but put 
a priority on a monist methodology: mathematical formalism within an axiomatic 
deductive system (see for example Hahn, 1973).  
The clinging on to this monist methodology is in part an (understandable) 
unwillingness to embrace what is seen as the alternative, pure pluralism. At the 
epistemic level, pure pluralism implies a plurality of approaches to building up 
knowledge, which supports a plurality of methodologies and thus of theories. It is the 
                                                          
3 We are referring here to the modern use of the criterion rather than Robbins’s (1932) original 
exposition. 
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extreme relativism which Blaug (1980) categorises as the ‘anything goes’ approach. 
There is an infinite range of legitimate theories, without any (monist) absolute 
methodological criteria for choosing between them. If this were the only alternative, 
then indeed science in any meaningful sense would be impossible.  
But this dualist, all-or-nothing view of knowledge is a reflection of  epistemology 
itself being understood as a closed system, with only two categories which are 
mutually-exclusive and all-encompassing, and of fixed meaning. Neither category is 
workable as a means of building knowledge about a reality which, as far as we can 
have access to it, is pluralist. In practice, since scientific practice addressed to real 
problems is driven by the nature of the real subject matter, a study of practice reveals 
that it is the middle ground between monism and pure pluralism which is the main 
focus.4  
As a guide to knowledge systems, it is important to note that reality apparently is not 
pluralist in a pure sense. In the social world in particular elements of (provisional) 
fixity have evolved in order for the system to function: these include institutions such 
as the firm, conventions such as price-setting, and habits of mind such as formation of 
expectations which are not continuously revised. Rather than complete diversity, we 
have pockets of commonality which promote effective communication and co-
ordination. Individuals rarely operate as isolated atoms, but rather condition their 
behaviour by the common mores of society.  
Just as the nature of social reality, therefore, can be understood as a structured 
plurality, so knowledge systems can be understood as a structured plurality, allowing 
for a finite range of methodologies. Each methodology is validated by a scientific 
community which judges this methodology to be the best to address an open system 
reality. That judgment in turn is based on that community’s view as to the main 
features of the real social system. Thus in economics some will focus on 
methodological individualism, some on class, some on institutions, and so on. 
In turn, an open-system methodology, to be operational, requires some closure (Chick 
and Dow, 2001, Loasby, 2002). Building a theory requires that some variables be 
taken as exogenous, and that there is sufficient stability in the underlying causal 
mechanisms for them to be drawn out. Theory inevitably abstracts, and abstraction is 
a form of closure. But closure within an open system is different from closure within a 
closed system. In the former, any closure is only partial and provisional, for the 
purposes of analysis, while in a closed system, closure of a subsystem is part of the 
overall set of predetermined relationships between atomistic variables. In a closed 
system, it is in principle possible to put together all the closed subsystems in a 
coherent whole. If the (monist) method of mathematical formalism is applied to all 
subsystems, then it is a technical question how they should be put together. In an open 
system, however, if the methodology is not monist but pluralist, then the methods 
selected for analysing different subsystems may be incommensurate, so that the parts 
cannot be combined using one method into a whole. Further, the closure is partial – 
the influence of exogenous variables cannot be assumed to be stochastic – and 
provisional – the form of closure may change as the subject matter evolves.  
Since neither pure monism nor pure pluralism has proved to be an adequate guide to 
policy, most of economics occupies some of the middle ground between the two. In 
the next section we attempt a mapping out of the middle ground. 
                                                          
4 For McCloskey (1983), a monist mathematical formalism provides the framework for the official 
rhetoric of economics, while a more pluralist approach characterises the unofficial rhetoric. 
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Pluralism and Economics 
Conceptions of the economy as an open system are based on an understanding of 
human behaviour as being purposeful and creative (and thus not deterministic) and 
also as being social; social behaviour in turn is influenced by conventions and 
institutions which evolve over time in an indeterminist fashion. If we accept this 
conception of the real social world is an open system, that there is no basis for 
building economic knowledge in the form of laws, then there is scope for 
methodological pluralism, that is, a range of views as to the best way to build up 
economic knowledge. Pure methodological pluralism being unworkable, given the 
real social nature of science, the range of methodologies is limited to a range of 
communities. These communities are identified with different paradigms – 
mainstream, Post Keynesian, institutionalist, etc – which take different views as to the 
essential nature of the economic process, and thus different views as to how best to 
build up knowledge about it (Dow, 1996).  
To be operational, a pluralist approach requires some closure – focusing on some 
variables rather than others, taking different things as given etc. Just as in the real 
economy, closure enables rather than constrains, but only if the closure is partial and 
provisional. It is closures which remain fixed in the face of evolutionary change 
which ultimately constrain, both in the economy and in knowledge (Hawkins, 2000). 
With this in mind, we now consider whether there is any difference in kind between 
the closures involved in mainstream economics and those involved in the various 
heterodox approaches to economics.  
Having moved away from explicit espousal of the ideals of general equilibrium 
theory, mainstream economics gives the appearance of a moderate form of pluralism. 
The parts do not readily fit together to make a whole. There is in particular a 
bifurcation between theoretical and applied mainstream economics. Both theoretical 
and applied models, in turn, are often partial. Most mainstream economists, were such 
explicit methodological discussion more commonplace, would probably justify this 
situation in terms of the complexity of the subject matter, knowledge limitations etc in 
a way which seems to accord with open systems thinking. 
But the key ingredients of the monist methodology of logical positivism are still there. 
First, theory is built on the axioms of rational individual behaviour. Second, empirical 
work is presented as ‘testing’ theory.5 The difficulties in putting the theorising and 
testing together are seen as procedural and regrettable. The underlying conception of 
reality and knowledge therefore is a closed-system conception. If the building blocks 
of theory are (narrowly-defined) rational individuals and the conclusions of theory 
can be tested against objective ‘facts’, then the presumption is that the economy is a 
closed system waiting to be discovered.  
Further, this closed-system conceptualisation applies to pluralism itself. Within a 
closed system, pluralism involves many all-encompassing, mutually-exclusive 
categories with fixed meaning, where dualism involves two such categories and 
monism one. Theory is one category and empirical testing another. In principle, 
                                                          
5 Two characteristics which reveal closed-system thinking are the tendency to derive policy 
conclusions directly from a model (with simplifying assumptions) without explicit justification, and 
also the reference to theory testing; see Lawson (1997) for a detailed critique of the use of 
econometrics for testing theory. 
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mathematical formalism should be able to represent all different categories in a 
commensurate manner, allowing their combination into a whole. 
In contrast, the pluralism of heterodox economics is an explicit response to the 
openness of the real economic system. This system is understood to be such that 
covering laws are not there to be discovered. Rather there are underlying causal 
mechanisms (the system is not chaotic) which we experience only indirectly. Further 
these mechanisms, as tendencies, are not always in operation, and, when they are in 
operation, can operate across each other. As the institutions and conventions of the 
economy evolve, so too do the ways in which the causal mechanisms operate. Finally, 
knowledge is seen as socially-constructed. This is important for the subject matter of 
economics, since knowledge is a key aspect of the economic process.  
But social-constructedness is also important for our understanding of our own 
economic knowledge. Different paradigms understand the economy differently and 
have a different conception of what constitutes ‘the facts’. Categories are not 
mutually-exclusive, all-encompassing with fixed meanings. Within an open-systems 
mode of thought, pluralism itself involves partial, provisional closures.  
The implications of this different foundation for pluralism, in an open-systems 
understanding of the economic system, are profound. Methodological pluralism itself 
is welcomed as providing a range of means of building up knowledge of a complex 
whole. Since the closures of this type of pluralism are partial and provisional, there is 
an openness to cross-fertilisation of ideas across paradigms. This is increasingly 
evident in non-mainstream economics, with the emergence of umbrella institutions 
like ICAPE and AHE6, and in the work of younger scholars which is increasingly 
addressed to the middle grounds between paradigms. Indeed, to employ the metaphor 
of biological evolution, variety is essential to the survival of a species in the face of 
unpredictable outside influences.  
Second, methodological pluralism grounded in the inability of any one set of 
methodological principles to dominate as the best way to construct knowledge in turn 
justifies pluralism of method. Different paradigms, employing different 
methodological principles, will employ a different range of methods suited to those 
principles. This is not eclecticism in the sense of ‘anything goes’ regarding choice of 
method. It is a conscious choice of method derived from a particular paradigmatic 
understanding of the nature of the real world and the consequent choice of 
methodology. Thus, for example, Keynes could accept the use of formal mathematics 
and econometrics as contributing to analysis, if they could be justified by the subject 
matter; specifically the closures entailed by econometrics had to be mirroring 
something approximating a closure in the real world. This typifies an open-systems 
pluralism, in contrast to mainstream economics which presents itself as consisting 
solely of mathematical formalism and econometric testing.  
Now that we have explored the reasons for pluralism and the different meanings of 
the term, we are in a position to turn explicitly to the needs of the policy-maker 
looking to economics for guidance. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics, and the Association of 
Heterodox Economists, respectively. 
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Pluralism and Policy-Making 
Theoretical pluralism poses problems for policy-makers in that theoretical economics 
itself does not generally present one clearly preferable policy solution to particular 
problems. There may be different assumptions, different uses of evidence, different 
understandings of the evidence and different uses of language which make the 
different bodies of theory incommensurate. And methodological pluralism means that 
there is no one set of criteria agreed on by economists by which to decide which is the 
best theory.  
Nor is it reasonable for policy-makers to consider all methodologies and all 
theoretical approaches when deciding on a policy measure. Policy-makers usually do 
not have the luxury of time to consider all the methodological options. Further, it is a 
tall order for anyone simultaneously to retain several different conceptualisations of 
reality, uses of language, and so on. Just as an academic economist belongs to a 
particular community within which there is a shared conceptualisation of the 
economy, use of language and so on in order to function, the same applies to policy-
makers. Kuhn (1970) argued that normal science within paradigms is the process by 
which science progresses. This implies that policy-makers need to decide on a 
particular understanding of the nature of the economic process first of all, and only 
then on the methodology and theoretical approach which follows. This is how schools 
of thought within economics are defined. The decision then is taken at the level of 
ontology. Looking only at the level of theory, there is no clear basis on which to 
choose one theory over another. 
But policy-makers face more immediate questions than academic economists about 
the congruity of theory with reality. The closure involved in defining paradigms for 
Kuhn was a provisional and partial closure. At the same time as most economists are 
engaged in normal science, some are engaged in extraordinary science, examining the 
ontological and epistemological foundations of the ruling paradigm. What sparks off 
attention to this activity, and potentially a scientific revolution, is the growing 
perception of a disjunction between the dominant paradigm and reality. The classic 
case in economics is the Great Depression, which challenged a ruling paradigm which 
did not address unemployment. Since the real world evolves, new problems emerge to 
which the ruling paradigm may not be best suited. Policy-makers need to be more 
alert than most to the possibility that their chosen paradigm no longer addresses the 
problems they now face. More than academic economists, therefore, policy-makers 
need to be aware of a range of paradigms and be ready to either adapt or shift 
paradigm if the nature of the real problems they face changes. 
From this point of view, therefore, pluralism is helpful to the policy-maker. Since the 
real world, and thus the nature of the problems policy-makers face, changes over time, 
a single approach would be seriously inadequate. It is only if the real world retains its 
essential characteristics, and these can be understood to operate within a closed 
system that one (closed-system) approach would be judged to be appropriate. If the 
real world is understood as an open system, therefore, pluralism is to be welcomed 
rather than thought of as a problem. The crucial point is to recognise the origins of 
theoretical approaches in methodological approaches and ultimately in conceptions of 
reality.  
At the level of method, too, pluralism can be seen to be helpful to the policy-maker. A 
monist methodological approach involves one method, as in mathematical formalism 
(the method best suited in economics to a closed-system approach). An open system 
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approach sees no one method as being sufficient and therefore advocates recourse to a 
range of methods. Knowledge can then be built up by approaching an issue from a 
variety of directions, employing different methods. By definition these methods are 
incommensurate (or they could be collapsed into one method). Thus for example 
questionnaire evidence is of a different sort than historical time-series evidence; they 
can’t be put together in any formal way, but each does provide some knowledge. 
Different collections of methods will be suited to different methodological 
approaches. 
Pluralism thus is helpful for policy-makers in addressing a changing economic system 
where there are different types of knowledge about it. But, while more helpful than a 
monist approach in dealing with reality understood as an open system, it poses 
particular challenges. The key challenge is in choosing a paradigm, deciding when it 
now longer addresses real problems as they emerge, and considering whether adapting 
the paradigm is sufficient, or whether a switch of paradigm is required. Since policy-
makers operate within a political arena, too, there will be criticism from the 
perspective of other paradigms, so that there needs to be a continual awareness of how 
thought is progressing in other paradigms. The second challenge lies in putting 
knowledge together within the chosen paradigm. Different methods of building 
knowledge may appear to cut across each other for example. If there are underlying 
causal mechanisms, which we cannot directly access, but which themselves can cut 
across each other, then it is inevitable that empirical knowledge of different sorts will 
be confusing.  
The faculty which policy-makers require to deal with these challenges is judgment. 
Rationality in the rational economic man sense is insufficient, since that requires 
information held with certainty and thus a closed system (all relevant variables known 
and so on). Judgment rather is the exercise of practical reason, or, as in the Keynesian 
literature, human logic or ordinary logic (see Mizuhara and Runde, forthcoming). This 
is the exercise of reason under uncertainty, where rational belief is built on a 
combination of direct knowledge, on the one hand, and on indirect, theoretical 
knowledge which draws on imagination and convention as well as reason, on the 
other hand. The monetary policy literature poses the issue of choice among a plurality 
of theories as ‘model uncertainty’. By posing the issue in formalist (monist) terms, 
this literature seeks a formal solution. But Keynesian uncertainty, expressed in open-
systems terms, indicates the need for practical reason which draws on a range of 
methods in order to arrive at an (uncertain) conclusion (Dow, 2001). This implies that 
skills in judgment, that is in the exercise of practical reason, are essential for effective 
decision-making. We turn in the next section to considering what this implies for 
economics education. 
 
Pluralism and Education 
Economics education has increasingly become dominated by the monist methodology 
of mathematical formalism. Training has focused increasingly on building up 
technical expertise in formal modelling and empirical testing. This is most noticeable 
at the graduate level, and has been documented in various studies, notably Colander 
and Klamer’s (1987) survey of graduate students and Krueger et al’s (1991) study 
commissioned by the American Economic Association. This trend is an affirmation of 
the methodological preference for mathematical formalism, which students implicitly 
absorb and then tend to perpetuate. In addition, time being a scarce resource, the 
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increase in attention to training in mathematical formalism squeezes out training in 
other skills and sources of knowledge, so that students are provided with less 
equipment with which either to assess the relative merits of mathematical formalism 
or to adopt an alternative methodology. But the surveys noted above reveal that 
students themselves are aware of the disjunction between theory and real-world 
experience. 
The first requirement, then, is that economics education include instruction on 
methodology, to increase awareness of what is involved in methodological choice. 
Students, like policy-makers, may still opt for mathematical formalism. But no 
methodology can be said to have the best (or indeed any) claim to truth, so that choice 
in favour of one approach requires awareness of the opportunity cost involved in 
rejecting other approaches. In fact, from a pluralist standpoint, methodological 
awareness is essential if policy-makers are to be able to respond to a changing real 
environment, assessing how far their chosen methodology is still preferable. 
At what stage of an economics degree program methodological instruction occurs is a 
matter for debate. The educational approach adopted in higher education during the 
Scottish Enlightenment, and continuing thereafter, was to teach all subjects 
historically, so that an awareness developed naturally of knowledge systems 
developing and changing in the light of what was needed in order to address practical 
problems. Further, early instruction in moral philosophy provided a grounding in  
epistemology. Ideally, I would suggest, methodological awareness should be 
developed in students naturally as a by-product of how economics is taught, with 
explicit methodological instruction only as a more specialist activity once substantial 
knowledge of economics has been built up. 
The historical approach has particular importance for economics. As an open social 
system, any economy evolves over time, requiring theory and possibly methodology 
to change with it. Economic history and the history of economic thought provide an 
array of case studies by which to learn how, in new situations to arise in the future, 
theory might adapt to suit changing circumstances. For the monist mathematical 
formalist, economic history simply extends the data set for testing timeless theory. 
But by studying different cases of theory development and of the building up of 
knowledge more generally, students can learn to develop their own judgment. In the 
process students also learn about a range of methods of acquiring knowledge other 
than published data sets.  
The type of educational approach suggested here would ideally be general to all 
subjects. If all subjects were taught historically, with the knowledge that all students 
were trained in philosophy, then the question of drawing across disciplines for 
different types of knowledge would follow naturally. The increasing 
professionalisation of academic fields puts up barriers to communication across fields. 
Within the social sciences, economics in addition puts up barriers by treating the 
economy as a closed system and thus, as we have seen, economics as a closed system 
of knowledge. Yet, if the economy is understood as an open system, then it follows 
naturally that economists would, as part of their pluralist approach, look to other 
disciplines for additional sources of knowledge about the economy.  
Thus, while ideally a radical restructuring of modern education would seem to be 
called for, there is much that could be achieved in the meantime within the economics 
curriculum itself. But it has got to the stage that a pro-active effort is required to 
achieve this. Until recently, economics was taught by instructors who may well have 
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adopted the methodology of mathematical formalism, but who nevertheless had been 
educated much more broadly themselves. The teaching staff increasingly now have 
mostly come through mathematical formalist programs themselves Many economics 
programs are in fact much broader than a pure form of mathematical formalism. Many 
academic economists are applied economists who themselves have to grapple with the 
disjunction between formalist theory and reality. Students learn much from them 
about the exercise of judgement. But as long as the official discourse is that of 
mathematical formalism, and signals are given to students that technical skill is more 
important than methodological awareness, then educational opportunities are being 
missed. Further the official rhetoric carries forward into policy-making circles, 
influencing how analysis is presented and understood, inhibiting the practice of 
pluralism. 
 
Conclusion 
We have considered theoretical pluralism as a problem faced by policy-makers, and 
concluded that it may in fact be something to be welcomed. To pursue this question 
further, it was necessary to put theoretical pluralism in the context of the 
methodologies within which the theories were developed, and the understanding of 
the nature of the reality being studied. In particular, it was argued that pure pluralism 
(an infinite plurality) is unworkable. When we talk of a workable pluralism, we are 
talking of a structured form, whereby there is a limited range of approaches, each 
approach is conditioned by the underlying understanding of the nature of the 
economy, and each approach is therefore open to change.  
If the real world is understood as a closed system, then it follows that one best way of 
identifying the laws which govern that system can be identified. This monist 
methodology provides the criteria by which the policy-maker can choose the best 
theory.  
However if the real world is understood as an open system which evolves internally as 
well as in its external relations, then no one best way of theorising about it can be 
established; the logical consequence is methodological pluralism. It is then welcome 
to have a range of approaches available for the policy maker to choose among. But it 
is also important therefore for policy-makers to be methodologically aware. This does 
not mean that they should constantly actively function simultaneously within the 
different paradigms. Rather it means that there should be awareness of the limitations 
of any one approach, awareness of the nature of alternatives, and sensitivity to the 
point at which the chosen methodology and theories no longer shed light on a 
changing reality. Progress in knowledge (by some criteria) requires adoption of one or 
other paradigm, even if the eventual outcome is to change to another one or create a 
new one. Further, just as the partial, provisional closure of paradigms facilitates the 
building up of knowledge, theorising itself requires some closure of a partial and 
provisional sort to be useful. But it is this modified form of closure, rather than the 
fixed application of the ceteris paribus clause which allows theory to be applied to a 
reality where ceteris paribus does not in general hold, and certainly not in any fixed 
way. 
We then discussed the implications for economics education of this embracing by 
policy-makers of pluralism. Technical skill has come to dominate economics 
education, particularly at the graduate level, at the expense of education in other 
skills. Of primary importance is the teaching of methodological awareness. This need 
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not take the form of separate specialist courses. Indeed it is all the more effective for 
economics to be taught in such a way that methodological awareness is absorbed 
naturally. This would follow from a historical approach to teaching which encourages 
the idea that economic theories and evidence may change to suit the practical 
requirements of different contexts, and that different economists may quite 
legitimately offer different accounts of the same circumstances, and different policy 
solutions. By studying the development of theories to address particular contexts and 
the application of different methods, students will build up the skill of judgement 
which is central to the role of the policy-maker.  
To conclude, if there has been a single theme in the paper it has been the following: 
far from being a source of weakness, the kind of modified pluralism presented here 
(with partial, provisional closures) is a source of strength. To exploit this strength 
requires an openness of mind to the different possibilities for economic analysis and 
training beyond the technical skills of mathematical formalism. 
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